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I. INTRODUCTION
USINESS persons and their advisors often confront the question
of what form of business organization they should select for their
businesses. Nontax factors ordinarily are not difficult to evaluate,
generally requiring a balancing of the need for limited liability against the
cost and complexity of establishing an entity that provides limited liabil-
ity. With the low cost of incorporating and state corporation codes al-
lowing flexibility in establishing internal governance, the selection of the
corporate form rarely would be a poor choice. Moreover, business peo-
ple like the corporation, because it is "comfortable with a safe and pre-
dictable format."' No one, of course, can ignore the federal income tax
consequences of operating the business-too often they constitute the
single greatest cost affecting the choice of form issue. An estimation of
that cost, unfortunately, requires an analysis of the tax consequences of
operating under a myriad of business organization forms-as a C corpo-
ration, an S corporation, a general partnership, a limited partnership, and
a limited liability company.
The differences between the C corporation and the other four forms,
all of which are conduits for federal income tax purposes, are stark and
perhaps should be preserved. 2 But should the law expect its practitioners
to master the rules of four different types of conduits, each with its hybrid
complexities? This difficult analysis bewilders lay people and is abstruse
even for many lawyers. Indeed, a byproduct of this abstruseness is the
substantial work that it produces for those advisors who can detect the
nuances in the tax treatment of the different forms and employ them to
1. Lee A. Sheppard, Shopping S Corporation Revision, 61 TAX NOTES 1666 (1993).
2. For some recent discussions, see Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, Taxes, Agency
Costs, and the Price of Incorporation, 77 VA. L. REV. 211 (1991); Joseph A. Snoe, The
Entity Tax and Corporation Integration: An Agency Cost Analysis and a CaU for a Deferred
Distributions Tax, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1993). Of course, there have been recurrent
proposals to integrate the individual and corporate income taxes. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY, REPORT ON INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEM:
TAxING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Integration of the Per-
sonal and Corporate Income Taxes: The Missing Element in Recent Tax Reform Proposals,
88 HARV. L. REV. 532 (1975); Scott A. Taylor, Corporate Integration in the Federal Income
Tax: Lessons From the Past and a Proposal for the Future, 10 VA. TAx REV. 237 (1990);
Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Integration of the Individual and Corporate Income Taxes, A.L.I. FED.
INCOME TAx PROJECT 1 (1993); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Relation and Integration of Indi-
vidual and Corporate Income Taxes, 94 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1981). Moreover, a bill has
been introduced in the Senate to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 in order to
replace the corporate income tax with a broad-based business activity tax. See S. 2160,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). The bill would impose a 14.5% tax on the amount of gross
receipts from business activities that exceed business purchases. The bill would repeal the
corporate tax, but impose a tax on a corporation's non-business income. For a brief discus-
sion of the proposed business activities tax, see Amy S. Cohen, Might Business Activities
Tax Replace Corporate Income Tax?, 62 TAx NOTES 816 (1994).
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their clients' advantage. But the choice of form decision should not be
that hard. Congress should undertake to reform the tax law regarding
passthrough entities. 3 That, I suggest, would consist of the establishment
of uniform rules for all conduits, with respect to both tax consequences
and eligibility requirements.
II. PRIVATE SECTOR DESIRES
The private sector frequently desires a form of business organization
that will entail limited liability for investors and be treated as a conduit
for federal income tax purposes. The conduit mechanism is attractive
whenever the enterprise is expected to produce losses or other deduc-
tions. Subject to the passive activity loss 4 and at-risk 5 rules, the holders
of equity interests in the conduits can take an immediate deduction equal
to their basis against income earned from other sources. 6 A C corpora-
tion is entitled to a section 172 net operating loss deduction,7 but it may
never have another tax year with taxable income and thus never get the
deduction. Even if it is able to use the deduction in a future year, it loses
the time value of money that an immediate deduction produces for the
owners of a conduit.
A conduit also constitutes a good choice for a prosperous enterprise
that will distribute most of its profits to the investors. The enterprise in-
come is taxed to the investors when earned, but the distributions gener-
ally are tax-free up to the investors' basis in their investment interests.8
This single level of taxation is, of course, superior to the infamous system
of double taxation of C corporations and their shareholders.9
Hoping to spur the economy by encouraging small businesses, Con-
gress adopted Subchapter S to fulfill exactly these desires of the private
sector: limited liability and partnership-like tax consequences.' 0 Con-
3. The Internal Revenue Code also creates several passthrough investment-oriented
entities: regulated investment companies (RICs), I.R.C. §§ 851-855, 860 (1988); real estate
investment trusts (REITs), I.R.C. §§ 856-860 (1988); and real estate mortgage investment
conduits (REMICs), I.R.C. §§ 860A-860G. See also Snoe, supra note 2, at 25.
4. I.R.C. § 469 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
5. I.R.C. § 465 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
6. I.R.C. §§ 702(a), 704(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (partnerships); I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1)
(1988) (S corporations).
7. I.R.C. § 172 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
8. I.R.C. § 731(a) (1988) (partnerships); I.R.C. § 1368(a),(b) (1988) (S corporations).
9. The choice between a conduit and a C corporation is also tax-rate sensitive. The
1993 changes in the tax rates inverted the I.R.C. § 1 and § 11 rates-the § 1 rates for indi-
viduals tend to be higher than the § 11 rates for C corporations. See generally I.R.C. §§ 1,
11 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). That inversion could dampen some of the enthusiasm for con-
duits, although investors need to account for the increase in the effective tax rate resulting
from the shareholder-level tax on dividends and other shareholder transactions. The 1993
changes constitute the second time in seven years that rates were inverted. See H.R. CoNF.
REP. No. 2264, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1993). The 1986 changes made the § 11 rates
generally higher than the § 1 rates. See H.R. CoNF. RFP. No. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-
13, 173-74 (1986). Obviously, the differential in the rates is not immutable and is subject to
the annual whim of Congress and the President.




gress also thought that Subchapter S would simplify the tax law by reduc-
ing its impact on the choice of business form.1' Congress probably
expected the S corporation to be the nearly universal selection, because it
provides not only limited liability, but a choice of the two primary sys-
tems of tax consequences (conduits and entity-level taxation). Closely-
held business owners have often used Subchapter S, but it has its imper-
fections and has never achieved its objective of reducing the impact of the
tax law on the choice of business form.
III. THE PROBLEMS WITH S CORPORATIONS
A. TAX CONSEQUENCES NOT QUITE AS GOOD AS PARTNERSHIP TAX
CONSEQUENCES
"Recondite" is a good adjective to describe what many people feel
about the law of partnership taxation: "very difficult to understand and
beyond the reach of ordinary comprehension and knowledge."'1 2 As one
tax court judge said:
The distressingly complex and confusing nature of the provisions of
Subchapter K present a formidable obstacle to the comprehension of
these provisions without the expenditure of a disproportionate
amount of time and effort even by one who is sophisticated in tax
matters with many years of experience in the tax field.... [I]ts com-
plex provisions may confidently be dealt with by at most only a com-
paratively small number of specialists who have been initiated into
its mysteries. 13
Yet, Subchapter K and partnership taxation has an exciting allure to the
low percentage of lawyers who actually understand it. These "partner-
ship wizards," it has been said, can wave "magic wands" to reduce or
even eliminate taxation for profitable enterprises and ventures. 14
The source of much of their magic is section 70415 and its nefarious
regulations. 16 According to section 704(a), a partner's distributive share
of each income or loss item is generally determined pursuant to the part-
nership agreement.' 7 A partner's distributive share need not be the same
for each item. For example, an item producing income can be allocated
to a partner with losses from outside the venture, and any item producing
11. Susan Kalinka, The Limited Liability Company and Subchapter S: Classification
Issues Revisited, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 1083, 1087 (1992).
12. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 189 (unabridged 1976).
13. Foxman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 535, 557 n.9 (1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 466 (3d Cir.
1965) (quoted in PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 4 (1991)).
14. Lee A. Sheppard, Partnerships, Consolidated Returns, and Cognitive Dissonance,
63 TAX NOTES 936 (1994).
15. I.R.C. § 704 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.704 (as amended in 1994). In the 1994-95 edition of CCH's FED-
ERAL INCOME TAX, CODE AND REGULATIONS, SELECTED SECTIONS (Martin B. Dickinson
ed., 1994), the section 704 regulations are 64 pages long.




losses can be allocated to a partner with income from external sources.' 8
The power to allocate items of income or loss is not, however, without
limits. Section 704(b) requires that the allocations in the partnership
agreement have "substantial economic effect."' 19 If an allocation does not
have substantial economic effect, a partner's distributed share of such
item is reallocated in accordance with the partner's interest in the
partnership.20
Yet, despite the constraint regarding substantial economic effect, the
partners' power to allocate tax items gives them unmatched flexibility.
As a writer recently quipped, some Subchapter K enthusiasts seem to
believe that partnership tax law is so flexible that the partners can do
almost absolutely anything they want without incurring any tax.21 Sub-
chapter S provides nothing comparable to the section 704 allocations. At
most, it permits shareholders to hold corporate debt; indeed, an S corpo-
ration is not even allowed to issue preferred stock.22
Another key distinction between Subchapter S and Subchapter K pri-
marily deals with highly leveraged enterprises. Partners can add their
proportionate shares of the partnership's liabilities to their basis in their
partnership interests. 23 Despite a taxpayer victory in one aberrational
case,24 S corporation shareholders are not entitled to add liabilities in-
curred by the corporation to their basis in their stock.25 This is an impor-
tant disadvantage of the S corporation, because the deductions that flow
through to both partners26 and S corporation shareholders27 are deducti-
ble on their individual tax returns in the current year only to the extent of
their basis in their investment interests. This makes partnership tax con-
sequences more desirable for highly leveraged enterprises, and it is often
18. IRC § 704(a).
19. I.R.C. § 704(b); McDANIEL, supra note 13, at 98.
20. I.R.C. § 704(b)(2).
21. Sheppard, supra note 14.
22. I.R.C. §§ 1361(b)(1)(D),(c)(5) (1988).
23. I.R.C. §§ 722, 752(a) (1988).
24. Selfe v. United States, 778 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1985).
25. See, e.g., Uri v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1991); Goatcher v. United
States, 944 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1991); Harris v. United States, 902 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1990);
Estate of Leavitt v. Commissioner, 875 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1989); Ley v. Commissioner, 66
T.C.M. (CCH) 113 (1993); Suisman v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 751 (1989); Bellis
v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 667 (1989); Fear v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH)
306 (1989); Erwin v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1343 (1989); Allen v. Commissioner,
55 T.C.M. (CCH) 641 (1988); Gurda v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 104 (1987);
Bader v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1398 (1987).
26. I.R.C. §§ 702(a), 704(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
27. I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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the primary reason investors choose Subchapter K over Subchapter S.28
Other differences in tax consequences are noted in the margin.29
As long as Subchapter K and Subchapter S have significant differences
in tax consequences, it will behoove good practitioners to learn the differ-
ences and use them to help their clients. Not that these distinctions make
sense. Why should partners get larger deductions than S corporation
shareholders? That is a flummoxing question. However, because of the
distinctions, the law will remain complicated, businesses will spend
money on tax advice, businesses without good tax advisors will pay more
taxes, and the federal fisc will be at the mercy of innovative tax advisors
using self help as described below.
B. SUBCHAPTER S's CONSTRAINING ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
The S corporation eligibility requirements, contained in section 1361,
are constraining. 30 They limit the number and types of shareholders an S
corporation can have, its capital structure, and the types of assets it can
own.31 Section 1361(b)(1)(A) limits S corporations to thirty-five share-
holders.32 Perhaps these limitations are needed to protect the tax reve-
nue generated by the C corporation regime. Yet there are groups of
investors whose numbers exceed the S corporation cap and who still de-
sire conduit tax treatment. They likely will find it under the current sys-
tem, either as a limited partnership or as a limited liability company. An
S corporation cannot have another corporation, a partnership, or a non-
28. See, e.g., Abraham P. Friedman, Choosing Between Corporate and Partnership En-
tities for Real Property Depends on Its Use, 11 TAX'N FOR LAW. 366, 367-68 (1983);
Kalinka, supra note 11, at 1108; Burton W. Kanter, To Elect or Not to Elect Subchapter S-
That Is a Question, 60 TAXES 882, 912-16 (1982); William J. Rands, Organizations Classi-
fied as Corporations for Federal Tax Purposes, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 657, 705-06 (1985).
29. A partner's contribution of capital to a partnership in exchange for a partnership
interest is generally tax free to both the partner and the partnership. I.R.C. § 721(a)
(1988). However, a shareholder who contributes appreciated property to an S corporation
must own at least eighty percent of the corporation immediately after the exchange for the
contribution to be tax free. I.R.C. §§ 351(a), 368(c), 1371(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Nonliquidating distributions of appreciated property to a partner are generally tax free to
both the partnership and to the partners. I.R.C. § 731(a) (1988). But an S corporation
recognizes gain upon a nonliquidating distribution of appreciated property to a share-
holder, and the shareholder recognizes gain to the extent that the fair market value of the
distributed property exceeds the shareholder's stock basis. I.R.C. §§ 311(b)(1), 1368(b)(2),
1371(a)(1) (1988). A partnership generally does not recognize gain or loss in a liquidation.
I.R.C. § 731(b). The liquidation of an S corporation triggers gain to the corporation to the
extent that it distributes appreciated property. I.R.C. §§ 336(a), 1371(a)(1). An S corpora-
tion can recognize loss on the distribution of property, provided the distribution does not
fall under section 336(d). See I.R.C. §§ 336(a),(d), 1371(a)(1) (1988). A partner can make
a § 754 election which allows a basis adjustment in his or her share of the partnership
property in order to reflect the outside basis in his or her partnership interest. I.R.C. § 754
(1988). A shareholder in an S corporation does not have a similar option. See, e.g., I.R.C.
§ 1367 (1988).
30. I.R.C. § 1361 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
31. Id.
32. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A). Originally set at ten shareholders, the Danforth-Pryor
proposal would increase the cap to 50.
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resident alien as a shareholder. 33 Undoubtedly, these restrictions bar
some syndicates of investors who want a passthrough entity from using
Subchapter S. Again, they likely can achieve conduit status by using a
limited partnership or limited liability company, entities that do not have
these restrictions.
Additionally, Subchapter S imposes a restriction on capital structure: S
corporations cannot have preferred stock.34 The shareholders and other
investors can achieve some of the same objectives that preferred stock
provides by taking debt from the S corporation. Indeed, changes in the
law have reduced the possibility of shareholder-held debt being deemed a
second class of stock, 35 a reclassification that would terminate the S cor-
poration election.
But debt carries nontax problems, e.g., inflexibility 36 and balance sheet
problems. 37 It does not provide the flexibility granted to partners by sec-
tion 704, which invites partners to use their partnership agreement to dis-
tribute the tax consequences amongst themselves.38 S corporations
cannot be part of an affiliated group, meaning they cannot own eighty
percent or more of the stock of another corporation and still be eligible
for the S corporation election. 39 This limitation interferes with state law
planning, which might include the use of subsidiaries for limited liability
purposes, and impedes acquisitions, which might include the purchase of
control of another corporation. Limited partnerships and limited liability
companies are not subject to this restriction.
It may be that the eligibility requirements for S corporations are too
strict and ought to be relaxed. Many, including the author and some of
our legislators in Congress,4° seem to think so. But until Congress de-
cides that conduit status should be available, or even required, for all
businesses, no matter how many investors a business has, no matter how
complex its capital structure is, no matter what types of owners it has,
some line-drawing is required, and some of the lines drawn will be arbi-
trary. What does not make sense is to continue these eligibility require-
ments for S corporations and not for limited partnerships and limited
33. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(B),(C).
34. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D),(c)(4) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
35. S. REP. No. 640, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3253, 3260.
36. Unlike preferred stock, debt generally carries a fixed obligation from the corpora-
tion to the debt holder. If the corporation is in financial trouble, it can withhold the pay-
ment of dividends; but, unlike a preferred stockholder, a debtholder has the power either
to compel payments on the debt or to force the corporation into bankruptcy. William J.
Rands, The Closely-Held Corporation: Its Capital Structure And The Federal Tax Laws, 90
W. VA. L. REv. 1009, 1096 (1988).
37. Putative lenders, e.g., banks, are wary of balance sheets heavily laden with debt.
In contrast to debt, preferred stock strengthens the balance sheet by decreasing the debt-
to-equity ratio, thereby making the corporation a more attractive borrower to outsiders.
Id
38. See I.R.C. § 704(a) (1988), Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(a) (as amended in 1994).
39. I.R.C. §§ 1361(b)(2)(A), 1504(a)(2) (1988).
40. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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liability companies. There is no principled reason to allow limited part-
nerships and limited liability companies to have a corporation as an
owner or to have more than thirty-five owners but not to allow the same
for S corporations. It is no more difficult to collect tax from a nonresi-
dent alien S corporation shareholder than it is from a nonresident alien
partner. Maybe it is difficult to allocate income or loss to holders of dif-
•ferent classes of stock, but it is also difficult to make the allocations in
accordance with a partnership agreement under section 704.41 Congress
should decide what requirements it wishes to impose on taxpayers who
want their businesses to be treated as conduits. For example, if Congress
wants to limit conduits to closely-held businesses, it could set a cap on the
number of owners, and, perhaps, delimit the types of owners the entity
could have. Whatever eligibility requirements Congress deems necessary,
they should be imposed on all the forms of conduits.
C. SUBCHAPTER S REFORM EFFORTS ARE LAUDABLE BUT Do NOT
ELIMINATE THE BASIC PROBLEMS
Senators Danforth and Pryor, members of the Senate Finance Commit-
tee, have introduced legislation that would remove many of the stultifying
eligibility requirements contained in Subchapter S.42 It would also make
some attractive tax changes in operating an S corporation. The number
of permissible shareholders would be increased from thirty-five to fifty.43
All the members of a single family would count as just one shareholder."
Tax-exempt organizations, financial institutions, and nonresident aliens
would be permitted to own corporation stock.45 The proposed changes
would also allow a more flexible capital structure. The S corporation'
would be permitted to issue convertible debt.46 It would be permitted to
issue preferred stock, though such stock could not be participating, could
not have redemption and liquidation rights exceeding its issue price, and
could not be convertible. 47 With those restrictions, it looks a lot like
debt. Still, it would be an improvement on the prohibition against pre-
ferred stock and would go part way toward allowing some of the flexibil-
ity accorded partnerships under the section 704(b) special allocation
rules.
The proposal would allow an S corporation to own eighty percent or
more of the stock of another corporation, though it would not permit the
related entities to file a consolidated return.48 It would expand the types
of trusts that can own S corporation stock, and ease some of the pitfalls
41. See I.R.C. § 704, Treas. Reg. § 1.704; see also supra note 16.
42. S. 1690, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994). Mr. Hoagland introduced the legislation to
the House of Representatives. H.R. 4056, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
43. S. 1690, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994).
44. Id § 102.
45. Id. § 111-13.
46. Id. § 201.
47. Id.
48. S. 1690, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 221 (1994).
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caused by invalid elections and inadvertent terminations.4 9 It would ap-
ply C corporation rules for fringe benefit purposes. 50 It would eliminate
the requirement of maintaining an AAA account for pre-1983 earnings
and profits.51
These reform measures are laudable. They reduce the distinctions be-
tween S corporations and partnerships (and one would think, as a by-
product, reduce the allure of limited liability companies). But they still
are not enough. The bill does not include a proposal that the principal
amount of an S corporation's debt that is personally guaranteed by share-
holders be included in the guarantor's basis in his stock. Accordingly,
debt-financed entities are still likely to desire partnership tax conse-
quences. In addition, though the reformed law would permit S corpora-
tions for the first time ever to issue preferred stock, the bill contains too
many restrictions. Preferred stock is always a hybrid form of investment
that contains elements of both common stock and debt. Its appeal to
investors depends at least partly on taking some of the best attributes
from each. Unfortunately, the preferred stock allowed by proposed sec-
tion 1361(c)(7)(B) would be required to have the worst attributes from
both common stock and debt. Because it would be stock,52 it would fall
behind all debt in a bankruptcy and thus be riskier than debt. Because it
would have to be nonparticipating and nonconvertible, 53 it would have
none of the speculative charm of common stock. Indeed, it cannot even
pay a premium on a redemption or liquidation,54 an unusual negative for
a senior security interest. Though it might be useful in a family planning
setting, it is unlikely to be the type of investment vehicle that will lure
new capital.55
The proposed changes are good in that they are an improvement over
the current system, but they leave untouched the basic problem. The tax
consequences from operating a business under Subchapters S and K
would still differ. Only the best practitioners would understand the dif-
ferences and use them to help their clients. The practitioners would still
advise their clients to use the entity that would produce the lowest tax
bill, regardless of whether or not it is the best organizational structure for
operating the business. The eligibility requirements would continue to be
different. Some investors who might prefer the corporate form would
still be relegated to a partnership or limited liability company structure to
obtain the desired tax consequences.
49. Id. §§ 114, 211.
50. Id. § 222.
51. Id. § 226.
52. Id. § 201.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Sheppard, supra note 1, at 1667.
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IV. THE EXAGGERATED DEFECTS OF LIMITED
PARTNERSHIPS
A. LIMITED LIABILITY
Until the emergence of the limited liability company, the limited part-
nership was the refuge for businesses that wanted limited liability, pre-
ferred partnership tax consequences over those of Subchapter S, or felt
that the Subchapter S eligibility requirements were too constraining. But
current thinking is that the limited partnership, though sometimes better
than an S corporation, generally is inferior to a limited liability company.
It probably is, but hardly by a sufficient margin to justify the creation of a
whole new area of business organization law.
While the limited partnership accords limited liability to the limited
partners, the limited partnership must have at least one general partner
who is personally liable for all the partnership debts.5 6 Moreover, limited
partners can be reclassified as general partners, and thereby lose their
limited liability, by participating too intrusively in the management of the
partnership business.57 In contrast, limited liability companies have
neither weakness. The codes creating limited liability companies give all
of the owners (called "members") limited liability.58 Limited liability
companies need not have a member with unlimited personal liability.
Also, their members are not punished for participating in the manage-
ment of the business. In short, members are just like shareholders.
Members are not vicariously liable for the debts of the business merely by
virtue of their status as owners, and they do not automatically lose this
protection merely by managing the entity's affairs.
Yet the superiority of the limited liability company over the limited
partnership is being exaggerated. It is common practice for a limited
partnership to use a corporation as its general partner. This practice insu-
lates the personal assets of the limited partners from potential seizure by
a creditor of the partnership. The corporate general partner has unlim-
ited liability, of course, but it need not have many assets.
Furthermore, the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act, adopted
in 48 states and the District of Columbia,5 9 has greatly reduced the
56. UNip. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 1, 9 (1916); REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP
Acr §§ 101, 403 (1976) (amended 1985).
57. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 7; REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP Acr § 303.
58. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
59. ALA. CODE §§ 10-9A-1 to -203 (Supp. 1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 32.11.010-.990
(1993); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-301 to -366 (1989 & Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN.§§ 4-43-101 to -1109 (Michie 1991 & Supp. 1993); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 15611-15723 (West
1991 & Supp. 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-62-101 to -1201 (West 1986 & Supp.
1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-9 to -381 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-101 to -1109 (1993 & Supp. 1994); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-401 to -499.25
(1990 & Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 620.101-.192 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 14-9-100 to -1204 (1994); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 425D-101 to -1108 (1993 &
Supp. 1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 53-201 to -268 (1994); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para 210/100
to 210/1205 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-16-1-1 to -16-12-6
(Burns 1995); IowA CODE ANN. §§ 487.101-.1105 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN.
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probability that a limited partner will be classified as a general partner
merely by participating in the partnership's business. According to the
Act, a limited partner, without fear of being reclassified as a general part-
ner, may act as an agent, employee, contractor, or advisor to either the
limited partnership or the general partner. 60
Some writers still argue that corporate general partners do not ade-
quately protect the personal assets of the limited partners, because a
court might pierce the corporate veil of the general partner to make them
individually liable, especially if the general partner is inadequately capi-
talized.61 Certainly, this is not an absolute impossibility, but it sounds
somewhat remote. There are only a few reported cases of attempts to
pierce the corporate veil of a general partner.62 Courts also express an
98 56-1a101 to -1a609 (1994); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. 89 362.401-.527 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
Supp. 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 401-530 (West Supp. 1994); Md. Code ANN.,
CORPS. & AsS'NS §§ 10-101 to -1105 (1993 & Supp. 1994); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 109, §§ 1-
62 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1994); MICH. CoMp. LAws ANN. §§ 449.1101-.2108 (West
1989 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN §§ 322A.01-.87 (West Supp. 1995); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 79-14-101 to -1107 (1989 & Supp. 1995); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 359.011-.691 (Vernon
Supp. 1995); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 67-233 to -297 (1990 & Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT.§§ 88.010-.645 (1994); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 304-B:1 to -B:64 (Supp. 1994); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 42:2A-1 to -72 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-2-1 to -63
(Michie 1988 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW §§ 121-101 to -1300 (McKinney
Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 59-101 to -1106 (1990 & Supp. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE
99 45-10.1-01 to -62 (1993 & Supp. 1994); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1782.01-.62 (Ander-
son 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 54, §§ 301-365 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995); OR. REv. STAT.
98 70.005-.490 (1988 & Supp. 1994); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ArN. §8 8501-8594 (Supp. 1995);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-13-1 to -68 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-42-10 to 42-10-2040 (Law.
Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 48-7-101 to -1105 (1991 & Supp.
1994); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 61-2-101 to -1208 (1989 & Supp. 1994); TEX. REV. CiV. STAT.
ANN. art. 6132a-1 (Vernon Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2a-101 to 2-1107 (1994);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-73.1 to -73.77 (Michie 1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 25.10.010-
.690 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE §§ 47-9-1 to -63 (1995); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 179.01-.94 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-14-201 to -1104 (1989 & Supp.
1994). Thirty-seven of these statutes are covered in Rev. Rul. 94-2, 1994-1 C.B. 311 and
Rev. Rul. 94-10, 1994-1 C.B. 316.
60. REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303; see also Frigidaire Sales Corp. v.
Union Properties, Inc., 562 P.2d 244, 247 (Wash. 1977); Western Camps, Inc. v. Riverway
Ranch Enters., 138 Cal. Rptr. 918, 926-27 (Ct. App. 1977).
61. See, e.g., Susan Pace Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Possible Choice
for Doing Business?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 721, 751-52 (1989); Joseph C. Vitek, Tax Aspects of
Limited Liability Companies, 27 CREIGrHTON L. REV. 191,208 (1993); see also John J. Rati-
gan, Comment, Piercing the Veil of the Corporate General Partner in the Hybrid Limited
Partnership: A Suggestive Remedy for Inequitable Conduct by Limited Partners, 17 SUF-
FOLK U. L. REv. 949 (1983) (arguing that courts should pierce the corporate veils of thinly
capitalized corporate general partners of limited partnerships).
62. A computer search produced only a few cases involving attempts to pierce the
corporate veil of a corporate general partner. While the courts seemed willing to do so
under appropriate circumstances, plaintiffs often failed to satisfy the requirements for
piercing the veil. See, e.g., Mid Kansas Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Orpheum Theater Co.,
810 F. Supp. 1184, 1195 (D. Kan. 1992) (not enough facts to complete the piercing analysis,
and piercing denied); In re City Communications, Ltd. v. Knobloch, 105 B.R. 1018, 1022-23
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (bankruptcy trustee permitted to pursue an alter ego claim against
the owners of debtor's general partner); Butler v. Collins, 14 B.R. 546, 548 (Bankr. E.D.
La. 1981) (producer hired by the corporate general partner was unable to pierce the corpo-
rate veil to recover money owed to him); Western Camps, Inc. v. Riverway Ranch Enters.,
138 Cal. Rptr. 918, 927 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (court held that the corporate general partner
was solely liable for the obligations of the limited partnership, where the creditor was
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extreme reluctance to pierce the corporate veil merely because of inade-
quate capitalization. 63 Lastly, it seems likely that a court would pierce
the veil of a limited liability company just as readily as it would pierce the
veil of a corporation.64
Moreover, the owners of a closely held venture can never be assured of
absolute limited liability. Factually, the distinctions with respect to lim-
ited liability between the different forms of business organization are not
nearly as dramatic in practice as they are in theory.65 The members of a
limited liability company and shareholders may theoretically have limited
liability, but if they seek to obtain credit for their businesses, the putative
lender is likely to require personal guarantees from the members just like
the lender would from shareholders in a closely held corporation. The
concept of limited liability also does not insulate shareholders, members,
or anyone else from personal liabilities for any torts that they themselves
commit while working for the business. Conversely, proprietors and gen-
eral partners sometimes can avoid personal liabilities to contract creditors
through a provision in the contract (e.g., using nonrecourse instead of
aware of the corporate status of the general partner and the corporation was "organized in
good faith and had an adequate capitalization necessary to liquidate its indebtedness"). In
Pearl v. Shore, 95 Cal. Rptr. 157, 161-63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971), the court refused to pierce
the veil of the corporate general partner to allow recovery by a limited partner. The court
disregarded the plaintiff's undercapitalization argument since the corporation was capital-
ized with $100,000. The court also indicated that the failure of the business had to do with
poor management and not initial undercapitalization. Id. See also Star Video Entertain-
ment L.P. v. Video USA Ass'n, 601 A.2d 724, 727 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (per-
sonal jurisdiction granted over the corporate general partners and their principals and
directors on the basis of an alter ego theory); In re Estate of Hall, 535 A.2d 47, 54-55 (Pa.
1987) (court refused to find that the two corporate general partners were mere fictions and
the alter egos of the decedent sole shareholder, and thus refused to pierce the corporate
veil for the purpose of the Dead Man's Act); Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties,
Inc., 562 P.2d 244, 245-47 (Wash. 1977) (court held that because the parties stipulated that
the limited partners never acted in any direct, personal capacity, and since their personal
affairs were kept separate from the affairs of the corporation, the separate corporate entity
should be respected).
63. See, e.g., Fisser v. International Bank, 282 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir. 1960); Newport
Steel Corp. v. Thompson, 757 F. Supp. 1152, 1156-57 (D. Colo. 1990); Marine Midland
Bank v. Miller, 512 F. Supp. 602, 604 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 664 F.2d 899 (2d
Cir. 1981); Arnold v. Browne, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775,783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); Consumer's Co-
op. v. Olsen, 419 N.W.2d 211, 216-18 (Wis. 1988).
64. Steven C. Bahls, Application of Corporate Common Law Doctrines to Limited Lia-
bility Companies, 55 MONT. L. REV. 43, 60-66 (1994). Professor Bahls discusses the appli-
cation of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil to limited liability companies. Noting
that some commentators have reserved judgment as to whether courts should apply the
corporate standards for piercing the corporate veil to limited liability companies, Professor
Bahls states that others have argued that the corporate standard should apply. The author
would allow for piercing the veil of the limited liability company, but with some differences
in rules to accommodate the differences between corporations and limited liability compa-
nies. Professor Bahls uses the Colorado limited liability statute, which directs the courts to
apply the case law for piercing the corporate veil to piercing the veil of limited liability
companies, as an example. Id. at 61 n.99; COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-107 (Supp. 1991).
Most state legislatures, though aware of the option of piercing the veil, are leaving the
issue to be developed by common law. See, e.g., Comments to the Montana Limited Lia-
bility Company Act § 23 at 10 (1993) (cited in Bahls, supra, at n.94).
65. WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPO-
RATIONS 91-92 (6th ed. 1980).
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recourse debt) in addition to limiting their individual tort liability by tak-
ing out liability insurance. Finally, the corporate shield (and presumably
the limited liability company shield) 66 is not impenetrable. The volumi-
nous case law in piecing the corporate veil clearly demonstrates this fact.
Does the limited liability company provide better protection against per-
sonal liability than the limited partnership? Yes, but not by much.
B. PASSIVE AcrivITY Loss LIMITATIONS
An unsettled issue is the application of the passive activity loss limita-
tions to the members of limited liability companies. S corporation share-
holders and both general and limited partners can run afoul of the section
469 strictures, but the regulations67 are the toughest on limited partners. 68
The taxpayer can avoid application of the passive activity loss limitation
by materially participating in the activity. 69 For most taxpayers, the regu-
lations provide that a taxpayer can be deemed to participate materially in
an activity by satisfying any one of seven alternative tests.70 For example,
the taxpayer materially participates if his or her participation in the activ-
ity for the taxable year constitutes substantially all of the participation in
the activity for such taxable year.7 1 But for a limited partner to partici-
pate materially, that partner must meet one of three "stricter" tests, each
of which requires the limited partner to participate in the activity for
more than five hundred hours in a year.72
Members of a limited liability company, then, would prefer to be classi-
fied as general partners rather than as limited partners, but the language
of the current regulation seems to require the members to be treated
under the tougher rules applicable to limited partners.7 3 This is because
the definition in the regulation focuses on a taxpayer's limited liability, 74
and limited liability company members have limited liability.75 Except
for limited liability, members probably have more in common with gen-
eral partners; like general partners, members are vested with managerial
powers, and they run the business. This sounds like material participa-
tion, and if the regulations are revised, it might well be that members are
treated as general partners.76 This would remove what might be a current
disadvantage for the limited liability company.
66. See Bahls, supra note 64, at 60-67.
67. See Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.469-5T(e), 1.469-5T(a)(1)-(3) (1988).
68. See An Interview With Susan Pace Hamill, 72 TAxES 327, 328 (1994); Vitek, supra
note 61, at 234-35.
69. I.R.C. § 469(c)(1)(B); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T.
70. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(1)-(7).
71. Id § 1.469-5T(a)(2).
72. See, e.g., Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(2); David C. Culpepper, Tax Aspects of
Limited Liability Companies, 73 OR. L. REv. 5, 21 (1994); Vitek, supra note 61, at 235.
73. Temp. freas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(e)(3).
74. Id
75. An Interview With Susan Pace Hamill, supra note 68, at 328-29.
76. Id.; see also Culpepper, supra note 72, at 21.
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V. TAX LAW BY SELF-HELP: THE EXAMPLE OF THE
MASTER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
Many of the best tax advisors are crafty. If they do not find the desired
mix of tax and nontax features on the current menu of available business
organization forms, they will construct a new form. Actually, the term
"new form" is an exaggeration. What they really do is reshuffle the char-
acteristics of current business forms to construct a hybrid entity that has
as its characteristics features of the preexisting types. In essence, this is a
type of self-help by the private-sector tax specialists. Dissatisfied with
what federal or state law offers, they use their ingenuity to develop a
more suitable form.
The emergence of master limited partnerships presents one such exam-
ple of self-help.77 Partnerships never have suffered the C corporation dis-
advantage of double taxation of distributed earnings, but this advantage
was tempered by the historically higher marginal tax rates for individuals
over C corporations. But Congress closed the gap between the C corpo-
ration and individual rates in 1982 and actually inverted them in 1986,
making the highest rate for C corporations higher than the highest indi-
vidual rate for the first time in history.78 As a consequence, partnerships
not only avoided the C corporation disadvantage of double taxation, but
often provided a lower rate of taxation on the entity-level earnings.
While partnership tax consequences had always been good for enterprises
that produced tax losses, they now were good for prosperous enterprises
as well. 79 Moreover, although under the Kintner Regulations80 the pub-
licly traded limited partnership was classified as a partnership for tax pur-
poses, in real life the entity had the nontax advantages associated with a
corporation. The limited partners were essentially no different than
shareholders. They traded their partnership interests on the public ex-
changes as if they were shares of stock.8' They had limited liability and
benefited from centralized management in the form of a general partner.
They were not saddled with managerial responsibilities and accompany-
ing fiduciary duties. 82 Thus, the master limited partnership possessed all
of the nontax benefits usually associated with a corporate form, and in
addition offered lower tax rates and no double tax on distributed
earnings.
The allure of the master limited partnership seemed almost irresistible,
but Congress quickly responded to this self-help corporate integration.
8 3
77. Master limited partnerships are sometimes referred to as publicly traded limited
partnerships. For a general discussion of the history of master limited partnerships, see
Marvin F. Milich, Master Limited Partnerships, 20 REAL EST. L.J. 54 (1991).
78. See id. at 61.
79. Id.
80. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1993).
81. Milich, supra note 77, at 55.
82. Id. at 58.
83. See I.R.C. § 7704 (1988). Congress enacted § 7704 in the Omnibus Budget Recon-
ciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 10211, 101 Stat. 1330-403 (1987). The statute
also enacted I.R.C. § 469(k) (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which applies the passive loss rules to
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Congress feared that the irresistibility of publicly traded partnerships
would result in a disincorporation of America.8 Congress was also con-
cerned that, since the nontax attributes were basically the same as those
of a corporation but entailed better tax consequences, virtually all pub-
licly traded entities would transpose themselves into master limited part-
nerships.85 That transposition, it was feared, would destroy the corporate
income tax and result in a devastating loss of Treasury revenue. 86 Ac-
cordingly, in 1987 Congress hastily enacted section 7704.87 This section
requires publicly traded limited partnerships to be treated as C corpora-
tions for federal income tax purposes,88 thereby thwarting the private sec-
tor effort at self-help.
VI. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
A. THE LATEST FORM OF SELF-HELP: BAD FORMATION OF TAX LAW
Limited liability companies are the hottest phenomenon in the legal
community. Not wanting to be left behind,89 virtually every state has en-
acted legislation that authorizes their creation.90 They are made the sub-
master limited partnerships, and I.R.C. § 512(c)(2) (Supp. V 1993), which provides that
tax-exempt organizations that invest in master limited partnerships must treat their share
of income as derived from an unrelated trade or business.
84. H.R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1065 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1,680.
85. Milich, supra note 76, at 63.
86. Id.
87. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, § 10211, 101 Stat. 1330-403 (codified
at I.R.C. § 7704 (1988)).
88. Id.
89. Referring to the enactment of limited liability company legislation in Oregon, one
writer stated: "Oregon's ability to attract and retain foreign business will be adversely af-
fected until such legislation is enacted. Oregon's need to remain in the forefront of new
and emerging trends and developments similarly will require that we legislatively provide
for the creation and operation of LLCs." Donald W. Douglas & David C. Culpepper, OR.
ST. BAR BULL., Dec. 1992, at 11, quoted in David L. Cameron, Strike Up the Band: The
Limited Liability Company Comes to Oregon, 30 WILLAmTrE L. REV. 291, 295 n.11
(1994).
90. See ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -61 (Supp. 1994); ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.50.010-.995
(Supp. 1994); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601 to 801-857 (1992); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-
32-102 to -1316 (Michie Supp. 1994); 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1200 (West); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 7-80-101 to -913 (Supp. 1992); 1993 Conn. Legis. Serv. P.A. 93-267 (West); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1106 (1992); 1994 D.C. Stat. 10-138; FLA. STAT. ANN.§§ 608.401-.471 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-100 to -1109 (Harrison 1993);
IDAHO CODE §§ 53-601 to -672 (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 180/1-1 to 180/60-1
(Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-18-1-1 to -13-1 (Bums Supp. 1994); IOWA
CODE §§ 490A.100-.1601 (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -1652 (Supp. 1992); .KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 275.001-.455 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 12:1301-:1369 (West 1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, §§ 601-762 (West 1994); MD.
CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS §§ 4A-101 to -1103 (1992); 1994 MASS. S.B. No. 72; 1994
MASS. H.B. 1798; MIcH. CoM. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.4101-.5200 (West 1993); MirNm. STAT.
§§ 322B.01-.955 (1993); 1994 Miss. LAWS ch. 402; Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 347.010-.735 (Vernon
1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8-101 to -1307 (1994); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 21-2601 to -
2645 (Supp. 1993); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.011-.571 (Michie Supp. 1991); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 304-C:1 to -D:20 (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 42:2B-1 to -70 (West 1994);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-1 to -74 (Michie 1993); 1994 N.Y. Laws ch. 576; N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 57C-1-01 to -19-07 (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-32-01 to -155 (Supp. 1993);
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ject of encomiums, 91 discussed in law review articles, 92 described at
1994 Ohio Laws 103; OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, §§ 2000-2060 (Supp. 1993); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 63.001-.990 (1994); 1993 PA. S.B. 1059; 1993 PA. H.B. 1719; R.I. GEN. LAWS 88 7-16-1 to
-75 (1992); 1994 S.C. Acts 448; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 47-34-1 to -59 (1993); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 48-248-101 to -606 (1994); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 1.01- 9.02
(Vernon Supp. 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-101 to -157 (Supp. 1993); 1993 VT. S.B.
314; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Michie 1993); 1994 Wash. Legis. Serv. ch. 211
(West); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-1A-1 to -69 (1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 183.0102-.1305 (West
Supp. 1994); WYO. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -143 (Supp. 1994).
91. See, e.g., Scott R. Anderson, The Illinois Limited Liability Company: A Flexible
Alternative for Business, 25 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 55, 108 (1993) ("the most advantageous alter-
native for many businesses"); Bahlis, supra note 64, at 44 (limited liability company as an
"evolutionary entity ... promises simplicity in formation, flexibility in planning and opera-
tion, limited liability, member control of the business, and significant tax advantages when
compared with corporations ... almost uniform praise for limited liability companies...
the most significant national development in the law of closely owned business organiza-
tions in decades"); Marybeth Bosko, The Best of Both Worlds: The Limited Liability Com-
pany, 54 OHio ST. L.J. 175, 175 (1993) ("perhaps the most innovative form of business
association"); Jerome Kurtz, The Limited Liability Company and the Future of Business
Taxation: A Comment on Professor Berger's Plan, 47 TAX L. REV. 815, 818 (1992) ("[t]his
is tax Nirvana"); Bradley J. Sklar & W. Todd Carlisle, The Alabama Limited Liability
Company Act, 45 ALA. L. REV. 145, 147 (1993) ("the business entity of choice"); Richard
Johnson, Comment, The Limited Liability Company Act, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 387, 388
(1983) ("the advantages . . . appear to be substantial"); Robert G. Lang, Note, Utah's
Limited Liability Company Act: Viable Alternative or Trap for the Unwary?, 1993 UTAH L.
REV. 941, 970 ("an exciting new entity"); Jimmy G. McLaughlin, Commentary, The Lim-
ited Liability Company: A Prime Choice for Professionals, 45 ALA. L. REV. 231,245 (1993)
("a practical alternative to both the professional corporation and the general partnership
by combining some of the best characteristics of each").
92. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 91; May B. Bader, Organization, Operation, and
Termination of North Dakota and Minnesota Limited Liability Companies, 70 N.D. L. REV.
585 (1994); Bosko, supra note 91; Frank M. Burke Jr. & John S. Sessions, The Wyoming
Limited Liability Company: An Alternative to Sub S and Limited Partnership?, 54 J. TAX'N
232 (1991); David C. Culpepper, Symposium on Oregon's Limited Liability Company Act:
Tax Aspects of Limited Liability Companies, 73 OR. L. REv. 5 (1994); S. Brian Farmer &
Louis A. Mezzullo, The Virginia Limited Liability Company Act, 25 U. RicH. L. REV. 789
(1991); Mark Golding, Symposium on Oregon's Limited Liability Company Act: Tax As-
pects of Converting a Partnership or Corporation into an Oregon Limited Liability Com-
pany, 73 OR. L. REV. 25 (1994); Mark Golding, Symposium on Oregon's Limited Liability
Company Act: Financial Aspects of Oregon Limited Liability Companies, 73 OR. L. REV.
55 (1994); Tanya Hanson, Symposium on Oregon's Limited Liability Company Act: A Sum-
mary of Fiduciary Duty Rules Under the Oregon Limited Liability Company Act, 73 OR. L.
REV. 129 (1994); Patrick J.S. Inouye, Symposium on Oregon's Limited Liability Company
Act: A Comparative Look at Oregon's Limited Liability Company Act, 73 OR. L. REv. 133
(1994); John D. Jackson & Alan W. Tompkins, Corporations and Limited Liability Compa-
nies, 47 SMU L. REv. 901 (1994); David Kopilak, Symposium on Oregon's Limited Liabil-
ity Company Act: An Articles of Organization and Operating Agreement Checklist for
Oregon Limited Liability Companies, 73 OR. L. REV. 151 (1994); Kurtz, supra note 91;
Stuart Levine & Marshall B. Paul, Limited Liability Company Statutes: The New Wave, 4 J.
CORP. TAX'N 226 (1993); Saul Levmore, Partnerships, Limited Liability Companies, and
Taxes: A Comment on the Survival of Organizational Forms, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 489 (1992);
John G. Martel, Symposium on Oregon's Limited Liability Company Act: Default Fiduci-
ary Duty Rules Under Oregon's Limited Liability Company Act, 73 OR. L. REV. 121 (1994);
Mary E. Matthews, The Arkansas Limited Liability Company: A New Business Entity is
Born, 46 ARK. L. REV. 791 (1994); Erich W. Merrill, Jr., Symposium on Oregon's Limited
Liability Company Act: Treatment of Oregon Limited Liability Companies in States With-
out Limited Liability Company Statutes, 73 OR. L. REv. 43 (1994); Sandra K. Miller, What
Standards of Conduct Should Apply to Members and Managers of Limited Liability Com-
panies?, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 21 (1994); Charles R. O'Kelly, Symposium on Oregon's
Limited Liability Company Act. Foreword- Understanding the Place of Limited Liability
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continuing legal education presentations, and made the subject of new
"how-to" treatises. 93 Their brief history resembles that of the master lim-
Companies in the Spectrum of Business Forms, 73 OR. L. REV. 1 (1994); Garry A. Pearson,
The North Dakota Limited Liability Company Act: Formation and Tax Consequences, 70
N.D. L. REv. 67 (1994); H. Edward Phillips, III, The Proposed Tennessee Limited Liability
Company Act, 24 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 491 (1994); Matthew W. Ray, The Texas Limited
Liability Company-A Possible Alternative for Business Formation, 46 SMU L. REV. 841
(1992); Thomas J. Sayeg, Symposium on Oregon's Limited Liability Company Act: Oregon
Limited Liability Company Act: Management Characteristics, 73 OR. L. REV. 113 (1994);
Everest A. Seaman, The Florida Limited Liability Company: An Update, 14 NOVA L. REV.
901 (1990); Sklar & Carlisle, supra note 91; Barbara C. Spudis, Limited Liability Compa-
nies: State Legislative Report, 5 J. CORP. TAx'N 183 (1993); Vitek, supra note 61; Curt C.
Brewer, IV, Comment, North Carolina's Limited Liability Company Act: A Legislative
Mandate for Professional Limited Liability, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 857 (1994); Susan E.
Connaughton, Comment, The Dawn of the Limited Liability Company in Virginia: An
Analysis of the Statute, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 177 (1991); S. Mark Curwin, Comment,
Fiduciary Duty and the Minnesota Limited Liability Company: Sufficient Protection of
Member Interests?, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 989 (1993); Keen L. Ellsworth, Comment,
Utah Limited Liability Companies: The "Ugly Ducklings", 1992 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1091; John-
son, supra note 91; Bill Powell, Comment, Limited Liability Company: Oklahoma's Lim-
ited Liability Company Act: Concerns, Considerations, and Conclusions, 46 OKLA. L. REV.
349 (1993); Joseph A. Rodriguez, Comment, Wyoming Limited Liability Companies: Lim-
ited Liability and Taxation Concerns in Other Jurisdictions, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 539
(1992); Teresa Mosley Sebastian, Comment, The Michigan Limited Liability Company Act:
A Viable Alternative for Michigan Business, 1 DET. C. L. REV. 151 (1993); Lee S. Sherrill,
Jr., Note, Corporate Law-Limited Liability Company Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 57C-1-91 to
-10-07, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1654 (1994); Stacy W. Wood & John T. Woodruff, Comment, The
Oklahoma Limited Liability Company, 29 TULSA L.J. 397 (1993).
See generally Mary J. Clariday, The Limited Liability Company: An S Corporation Alter-
native or Replacement?, 4 J. CORP. TAX'N 202 (1993); Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff,
Assessing the Limited Liability Company, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 387 (1991); Thomas E.
Geu, Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (Part
One), 37 S.D. L. REV. 44 (1992); Hamill, supra note 61; Kalinka, supra note 11; Louis A.
Mezzullo, Limited Liability Companies: A New Business Form?, 21 TAX'N FOR LAW. 296
(1993); Richard L. Parker, Corporate Benefits Without Corporate Taxation: Limited Liabil-
ity Company and Limited Partnership Solutions to the Choice of Entity Dilemma, 29 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 399 (1992); Ronald P. Platner, Limited Liability Companies Are Increas-
ingly Popular, 20 TAX'N FOR LAW. 225 (1992); Charles Price & Charles Edmonds, Limited
Liability Companies as Investment Vehicles, REAL EST. REV., Fall 1992, at 28; Edward J.
Roche, Jr. et al., Limited Liability Companies Offer Pass-Through Benefits Without S Corp.
Restrictions, 74 J. TAX'N 248 (1991); Barbara C. Spudis, Limited Liability Companies: A
New Choice in Entity Selection, 4 J. CORP. TAX'N 284 (1993); Curtis J. Braukmann, Com-
ment, Limited Liability Companies, 39 KAN. L. REV. 967 (1991); Jimmy G. McLaughlin,
Commentary, The Limited Liability Company: A Prime Choice for Professionals, 45 ALA.
L. REV. 231 (1993); C. Timothy Spainhour, Casenote, Limited Liability Companies in Ar-
kansas: The Knowns and the Unknowns, 16 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 27 (1994); Sylvester
J. Orsi, Comment, The Limited Liability Company: An Organizational Alternative for
Small Business, 70 NEB. L. REv. 150 (1991).
93. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. BAMBEROER & ARTHUR J. JACOBSON, STATE LIMITED LIA-
BILITY COMPANY LAWS: PRACnCE GUIDES, ANNOTATIONS, STATUTES, FORMS (1994);
CARTER G. BISHOP & DANIEL S. KLEINBERGER, TAX & BUSINESS PLANNING OF LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANIES (1993); WILLIAM P. BOWERS & PHILIP M. KINKAID, TEXAS LIM-
ITED LIABILITY COMPANY: FORMS & PRACTICE MANUAL (1994); J. WILLIAM CALLISON &
MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO
LAW & PRACTICE (1993); WAYNE J. CAREY & ELLISA 0. HABBART, DELAWARE LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY: FORMS & PRACTICE MANUAL (1994); ROBERT M. ERCOLE ET AL.,
MARYLAND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY & PRACTICE MANUAL (1993); JULIE
GOLDBERG, THE AUSTRIAN LAW ON COMPANIES WITH LIMITED LIABILITY (1985); YEAR-
BOOK OF THE LEBANESE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (1981); LAWRENCE A. GOLDMAN
& ALYCE C. HALCHAK, NEW JERSEY LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY: FORMS & PRACTICE
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ited partnerships. The private sector shuffles the Kintner characteristics
to concoct an entity that has both limited liability and partnership taxa-
tion. This achieves exactly what Subchapter S was supposed to do, but
has never quite accomplished. But the histories of these two tax-driven
concoctions also diverge. Fearful of a loss of revenue, Congress immedi-
ately took action restricting the advantages of master limited partnerships
by enacting section 7704. For some reason Congress has not touched lim-
ited liability companies. Moreover, the limited liability company has far
more momentum as states have jumped on the bandwagon with new leg-
islation. Whether or not its emergence constitutes good tax policy, it may
be too late, as a practical matter, for Congress to quash it as it did with
master limited partnerships.
No matter what the merits of the limited liability company (and in my
opinion, they are modest), its emergence is an example of badly formu-
lated tax law. Congress is expected to play the primary role in the crea-
tion of federal income tax law, but it has failed to act in the case of the
limited liability company. It has done nothing. Limited liability compa-
nies are not the brainchild of a brilliant tax policy expert, on loan to the
Treasury Department from Yale or Georgetown. Rather, the germinal
point in the history of limited liability companies was the issuance of Rev-
enue Ruling 88-76,94 which interprets the long outdated Kintner Regula-
tions and applies them to a Wyoming state statute! No disparagement of
the Wyoming legislature or people who issue revenue rulings is intended,
but they are not the parties who should be forging major shifts in federal
tax law.
Here is what should have happened. Prior to the issuance of Revenue
Ruling 88-76, the IRS should have alerted congressional staff members
that it was about to issue a revenue ruling treating Wyoming limited lia-
bility companies as partnerships rather than as corporations under the
Kintner Regulations. With the experience of master limited partnerships
fresh in everyone's mind, both the congressional staff and the IRS would
have known that, once the private sector digested the information about
limited liability companies, it would flock to that type of entity to circum-
vent the problems associated with other forms of business associations,
especially S corporations. Congress should then have decided whether or
not to permit this circumvention of the Subchapter S rules. It would have
MANUAL (1994); HARRY L. HENNING & RICHARD C. McQuowN, OHIO LIMITED LIABIL-
rry COMPANY: FORMS & PRACTICE MANUAL (1993); KENNETH M. JACOBSON ET AL., ILLI-
NOIS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY: FORMS & PRACTICE MANUAL (1994); JEFFREY L.
KWALL, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF THE CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED
LIABILrrY COMPANIES, AND THEIR OWNERS (1994); HOWARD N. LEFKowrrz & IRA AK-
SELRAD, NEW YORK LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY: FORMS & PRACTICE MANUAL (1994);
MARY V. MOORE, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: LEGAL RESEARCH GUIDE-PATH-
FINDER (1994); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATING, RIBSTEIN & KEATING ON
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES (1993); JEFFREY C. RUBENSTEIN ET AL., LIMITED LIABIL-
ITY COMPANIES: LAW, PRACTICE & FORMS (1994); ROBERT W. WOOD, LIMITED LIABIL-
ITY COMPANIES, FORMATION, OPERATION, & CONVERSION (1993).
94. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360 (classification of a Wyoming limited liability com-
pany as a partnership for federal income tax purposes).
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been most sensible to engage in a full-scale review of conduits and to
rewrite the rules so that they made more sense. Congress, of course, has
numerous pressing matters before it and may have lacked the time neces-
sary to complete such a major project. Still, Congress could have adopted
stop-gap legislation, e.g., by making limited liability companies meet the
Subchapter S standards as a prerequisite to being treated as conduits, un-
til it had time to engage in a fuller review. Instead, Congress remained
inert, allowing virtually all of the states to pass legislation. It may now be
hard to put the bull back in the barn.
B. CLASSIFICATION ISSUES: THE KINTNER REGULATIONS
In general, an organization may be classified as a corporation (called
an "association" in the regulations), 95 a partnership, a proprietorship, or
a trust. Despite the importance of the classification issue, the Internal
Revenue Code is unusually terse, leaving delineation of the law to courts
and regulations.96 Because of the virtual absence of statutory guidelines,
the Treasury regulations have served as a primary source of rules gov-
erning the classification issue. A product more of adversarial zeal than of
deliberative rule-making, the regulations represent the government's per-
sistent efforts to stop a particular tax practice that had seemed especially
odious to the Commissioner: professionals treating their businesses as
corporations for tax purposes so that they may achieve favorable tax
treatment for fringe benefits and deferred compensation plans. 97 The
current regulations can be traced back to a 1954 Ninth Circuit opinion,
United States v. Kintner.98 In that case a group of doctors convinced the
Ninth Circuit that the group's unincorporated association should be clas-
sified as a corporation for federal tax purposes.99 Incensed that physi-
cians and other professionals could obtain the tax benefits of qualified
pension plans, the Commissioner initially refused to follow the Kintner
decision.'00 After several subsequent courtroom defeats, however, the
Commissioner conceded on the issue.10 Undaunted, the Commissioner
quickly launched an attack against doctors by proposing new regulations,
which were adopted in 1960, known colloquially as the "Kintner Regula-
tions."'10 2 These regulations, still in effect today, constituted an un-
95. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1).
96. The author discussed the history of the Kintner Regulations extensively in his St.
John's article, supra note 28.
97. See Note, Professional Corporations and Associations, 75 HARV. L. REv. 776, 778-
79 (1962).
98. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
99. Id. at 428. The Kintner ruling should not have surprised anyone, given the fact that
both judicial and administrative precedent were strongly inclined toward corporate classifi-
cation at that point. See Rands, supra note 28, at 665-66.
100. See Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1 C.B. 598.
101. See Rev. Rul. 57-546, 1957-2 C.B. 886.
102. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -11.
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abashed attempt to overrule Kintner and are heavily weighted toward
partnership classification and against the association classification.10 3
The Kintner Regulations are thus a product of a bygone era. They have
also produced unintended byproducts: first, the proliferation of tax shel-
ter limited partnerships, and now the emergence of limited liability
companies.
The regulations take a mechanical approach to the classification issue.
They list the six characteristics of the "pure" corporation, the same char-
acteristics promulgated in Morrissey v. Commissioner,1°4 a 1935 Supreme
Court case: (1) the presence of associates; (2) an objective to carry on
business and divide the profits; (3) continuity of life; (4) centralized man-
agement; (5) limited liability of investors; and (6) free transferability of
investor's interests. 0 5 The regulations say that two of these characteris-
tics-the presence of associates and a business objective-are essential to
classification as an association. If these two characteristics are present,
the next step is to determine whether the organization has any of the
other four corporate characteristics. An unincorporated organization
should not be classified as an association unless it has more corporate
characteristics than noncorporate characteristics. If, however, any char-
acteristic is common to both the corporate and noncorporate form under
consideration, that common characteristic must be disregarded in the
weighing process. Hence, because both partnerships and corporations
are assumed to have associates and a business objective, an unincorpo-
rated entity must possess three of the other four characteristics to be clas-
sified as a corporation.
The Kintner Regulations, criticized 106 and outdated, provide the con-
text for limited liability companies. 0 7 Limited liability companies are un-
incorporated enterprises whose owners want to be treated as partnerships
for federal income purposes. According to the Kintner Regulations, this
means that they can have no more than two of the four characteristics
that differentiate corporations from partnerships. Invariably, the owners
103. See Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97, 105 (5th Cir. 1969); Richard A. Fisher,
Classification Under Section 7701-The Past, Present, and Prospects for the Future, 30
TAX'N FOR LAW. 627, 630 (1977); Rands, supra note 28, at 666; Norman C. Brewer III,
Comment, The Viability of a Tax Shelter Vehicle: Limited Partnerships with a Corporation
as Sole General Partner, 49 Miss. L.J. 469, 473 (1978); Rosemary Alito Hall, Note, Tax
Classification of Limited Partnerships: Opportunity for Reform, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 1260,
1265 (1977).
104. 296 U.S. 344, 359 (1935).
105. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1).
106. See, e.g., Rands, supra note 28; Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 185-86 (1976)
(upholding regulations, though disagreeing with the way they were written).
107. Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. 20, specifies the criteria that the I.R.S. will use to
evaluate a request for a letter ruling that a limited liability company is a partnership for
federal income tax purposes. For a full discussion of the Kintner Regulations and their
application to limited liability companies, see Alan G. De Nee, Limited Liability Compa-
nies, 31 U.S. TAX REP., July 29, 1993, § 3.
[Vol. 49
PASSTHROUGH ENTITIES
want limited liability.108 As a consequence, they can have only one of the
other three corporate characteristics (continuity of life, free transferabil-
ity of interests, and centralized management). To be classified as a part-
nership, they must forgo at least two of these three often very desirable
characteristics, though so far both the regulations and the Conmmis-
sioner's rulings have been liberal in finding that the entity lacks the cor-
porate characteristic in question.'0 9 This liberality is a function of the
regulations' heavy and outdated bias towards partnership classification.
But is this not the tax tail wagging the dog?
Opponents and commentators vaunt the limited liability company for
its flexibility.1 0 Yet, a closer look reveals that the attributes of the entity
must conform to fit within the confines of the Kintner Regulations. For
example, limited liability company statutes generally give each of the
members managerial powers equal to their equity in the enterprise, but
allow the articles or operating agreement to alter that general rule, pro-
viding for the election or appointment of managers. Centralized manage-
ment is an attractive, and at times essential, attribute for a business with
more than a few owners. Presumably many limited liability companies
would choose to have this corporate characteristic. That means that such
entities can have neither continuity of life nor free transferability of
interest."'
108. If they do not need limited liability, they can choose a general partnership and
have the tax consequences they desire without the need of using a limited liability
company.
109. Zuckman v. United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3
I.R.B. 20; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-10-019 (Mar. 6, 1992). For example, to avoid having the corpo-
rate characteristic of continuity of life, the limited liability company must dissolve on the
death, insanity, bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, expulsion, or other event of with-
drawal of a member. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (1994). Because continuity of life is
often a desirable feature for a business entity, the rule against it in the Kintner Regulations
is a negative for the limited liability company. It implies that the entity may have to be
liquidated upon the loss of just one member. But this perception is misleading, because
the members are allowed to agree in advance that members holding a majority interest in
the company can vote to prevent the dissolution of the entity and continue its business,
despite the dissolution event. Id. Limited liability companies can also limit dissolution tojust one type of event, e.g., death of the company's manager.
110. See, e.g., Cameron, supra note 89; Lang, supra note 91, at 960; Powell, supra note
92, at 379; Vitek, supra note 61.
111. Free transferability of interest is a corporate characteristic and is also often desira-
ble. According to the regulations, it means that each of the members owning substantially
all the interests in the organization must have the power, without the consent of the other
members, to substitute for themselves someone who is not a member of the organization.
Treas. Reg., § 301.7701-2(e)(1). Substitution means a complete transfer of all the attributes
of ownership. The right to assign a member's economic interests in the organization is not
enough to constitute free transferability of interest. Accordingly, the general rule in the
limited liability statutes is that the members have the power to confer all of their economic
rights on their transferees, but cannot transfer their rights to manage without consent of
the other members. This need to avoid free transferability of interest is a negative feature
of limited liability companies. The transfer of economic rights may satisfy some potential
buyers, but certainly others will want the managerial powers usually associated with own-
ership. Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. 20, allows full transfers by members owning less
than 20% of the company.
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C. AUTHOR'S LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES
I am not as enthusiastic about limited liability companies as many
others seem to be. They accomplish what Subchapter S was intended to
achieve-partnership tax consequences and limited liability. That may
be a good result, but this benefit is at least partially offset by the cost of
adding yet another type of business organization and thus complicating
what is already too complicated an issue-the choice of business entity
for a closely held enterprise. I would overlook this adverse side effect, if
the limited liability company represented a true improvement over each
of the forms that it is replacing. Though it constitutes a marginal im-
provement over the limited partnership, 112 I do not see the limited liabil-
ity company as an improvement over the corporation as a form for
operating a business. The limited liability company is not a new, im-
proved business form that will result in better management. The "safest"
limited liability company statutes, those that are "bullet-proof," contain
mandatory rules to prevent companies organized under them from having
too many corporate characteristics. The more flexible the statute, the
more danger that a company will accidentally cross the C corporation line
and lose its status as a conduit. In contrast, state corporation codes are
enabling acts that permit the owners of closely-held corporations to set
the governance structure for their business that best suits their needs.
Moreover, corporate structures and. corporate law are the product of
more than one hundred years of evolution. There is a well-established
jurisprudence about corporations. The American Law Institute recently
completed a thirteen-year study and analysis of corporate law. 113 In con-
trast, there is nothing settled about the law of limited liability companies.
Should the jurisprudence of piercing the corporate veil be applied to lim-
ited liability companies? 1 4 What fiduciary duties should apply to mem-
bers and managers?"15 Should limited liability companies be allowed to
have more than one member? 16 Should lawyers or other professionals
112. I see the limited liability company as an improvement over the limited partnership,
because the limited liability company requires nothing akin to a general partner. With the
advent of thinly capitalized corporate general partners, this limited partnership require-
ment, though a nuisance, is easily enough met. But why bother with it at all? These corpo-
rate general partners are really shams and do not serve the purpose of providing
partnership creditors with some financial security.
113. See AMERICAN LAW INsTrruTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (1994).
The A.L.I. Reporters began active work in 1980. 2 id. XI n.1. The Reporters completed
the work in 1993. Volume 2 carries a 1994 copyright.
114. See, e.g., Bahis, supra note 64.
115. See Miller, supra note 92; Curwin, supra note 92.
116. This issue has tax ramifications because the IRS will not treat an entity with just
one owner as a partnership. Rev. Proc. 95-10, 1995-3 I.R.B. 20. See John Godfrey, The
IRS and LLCs: Looking for a Bright Line, 65 TAx NOTES 955, 956 (1994).
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be allowed to organize as limited liability companies? 117 These are some
of the questions being explored. Is this not reinventing the wheel?
D. NOTICE 95-10: "CHECK-THE-Box"
The Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service are con-
sidering changes in the regulations that would allow unincorporated busi-
nesses to choose to be taxed as either a partnership or a C corporation. 118
The proposed new system, announced in Notice 95-10 and called "check-
the-box," would replace the current four-factor Kintner Regulations sys-
tem. Why are Treasury and the Service proposing what is virtually a ca-
pitulation? Unofficial remarks indicate a bowing to the inevitable: with
the advent of limited liability companies, the choice between partnership
and C corporation taxation has become functionally elective anyway." 9
Moreover, both the government and the private sector, they say, are
wasting resources on rulings for limited liability companies. 120 If
adopted, 12' the proposal would eliminate the nettlesome problem that
currently affects limited liability companies: the need to conform the en-
tity with the obsolete Kintner Regulations. For example, a limited liabil-
ity company no longer would be required to forgo free transferability of
interests, even though it needs continuity of life and centralized manage-
ment. The new system likely would solidify the limited liability company
as a primary choice for a passthrough entity and further reduce the ap-
peal of the Subchapter S corporation.
Would anyone still use the S corporation? Many S corporations al-
ready in existence probably would want to preserve their status, because
there is a tax cost in transferring assets out of an existing corporation. 22
Moreover, Subchapter S is substantially simpler than Subchapter K.
Some parties might be willing to trade away the flexibility of special allo-
cations available under Subchapter K, and its concomitant complexity, in
exchange for the simplified system of Subchapter S.123 Others may want
117. Kristina D. Topocki, Comment, Lawyer Liability Under Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 721 Versus The Illinois Limited Liability Company Act: Arguments for Allowing Law
Firms to Organize as LLCs, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 199 (1994).
118. I.R.S. Notice 95-14, 1995-14 I.R.B. 7.
119. Rod Garcia & Nancy Loube, LLCs, or How the Government Got to the Check-the-
Box Classification, 67 TAx NOTES 1139 (1995); Sheryl Stratton, IRS Proposes Check-the-
Box Entity Classification Procedure, 67 TAX NoTEs 26 (1995).
120. Garcia & Loube, supra note 119, at 1139; Stratton, supra note 119 at 26; see also
Marlis Carson, Treasury Officials Address Check-the-Box Entities, 67 TAX NOTES 1009(1995).
121. At this point, it is hard to see why the proposal would not be adopted. The gov-
ernment is making the proposal, and it concedes the game to the practitioners.
122. For example, liquidating distributions generally are taxable at both the corporate
and shareholder level. See I.R.C. §§ 331(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (sale or exchange treat-
ment for shareholders); I.R.C. § 336(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (fictional sale for liquidat-
ing corporation).
123. Remarks of Martin D. Ginsburg before the Senate Finance Committee (May 26,
1995), in 66 TAX NOTES 1825 (1995).
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to avoid the uncertainty associated with such a new entity as the limited
liability company. 124
Substantively, the check-the-box system would constitute only a slight
improvement over the current system. In constructing a limited liability
company, business owners would be able to choose characteristics for
their entities based on business considerations instead of tax classification
rules. That is good. Their advisors would no longer be required to wend
their way through the obsolete Kintner Regulations and could be assured
of partnership taxation when desired. But the improvement is only slight.
It leaves intact the operative tax rules, which are more complex than the
classification rules. The default rule under the check-the-box regime
would be Subchapter K and partnership taxation, the most complex of all
the possibilities. Choice of entity is such a routine decision for a lawyer
that the author suggests that the default rule might be something simpler.
Tax advisors already should have mastered the complexities of partner-
ship taxation, but many have not. Moreover, there still would be C cor-
porations and four types of conduits. It is tempting to believe that
owners and their advisors always would choose limited liability compa-
nies and partnership taxation over the other conduits, but that would not
always be the case. For example, someone might choose the S corpora-
tion for passive activity loss reasons or just because it is simpler. That
means that advisors would still need to know the distinctions between all
the conduits. They would certainly still need to be aware of the distinc-
tions between Subchapter C and Subchapter K. It is worth noting that
incorporations actually increased in 1994 over 1993. Obviously, many
people are not getting the message that limited liability companies are
preferable. The blissfully ignorant, of course, are also unlikely to be using
S corporations. Finally, the proposal would leave intact the unprincipled
distinctions between partnerships and S corporations. Why, for example,
limit the number of participants for S corporations but not for limited
liability companies?
The methodology of making the changes is poor, even if the substance
is good. The changes are about to be rushed through without careful
analysis. The Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department
seem to be reacting to pressure more than making an informed, reasoned
policy decision. No one, for example, appears to be considering the reve-
nue impact of the changes, or whether it would make better policy sense
to revamp Subchapter S than to rubberstamp the states' hurried decision
that limited liability companies should be the conduit of choice. The sen-
sible route would be a full-scale congressional review of the whole area of
conduit taxation. The changes would constitute too significant a shift in
the tax law for the executive branch to make on its own.





Congress should reform the treatment of passthrough entities by
adopting standard eligibility requirements for all of them. I am not much
concerned what the standards are, just that they be the same. There is no
principled reason why the standards should be different. One possibility
would be to allow elective conduit tax treatment for all closely held con-
cerns. Such a rule would preserve Congress's apparent resolve to pre-
serve entity-level tax for publicly traded enterprises. 125 Allowing an
election for such a large class of entities might well seem too expensive,
because owners would select conduit status only when that status would
result in a smaller tax burden. 126 But such an elective system virtually
exists already, because owners of any entity short of a publicly held enter-
prise can use a limited partnership or a limited liability company to
achieve passthrough tax treatment. 127 The term "publicly traded" is used
in section 7704, and therefore it does not seem too amorphous as the line
of demarcation. But perhaps it is, and perhaps it will allow too great a
drain on the federal fisc. If Congress concludes that it is not a proper
standard for these or other reasons, Congress certainly could resort to a
bright-line rule, as it so often has done in Subchapter C. Congress could
decide, for example, that only businesses with a hundred or fewer owners
could elect conduit treatment. As with all bright-line rules, the one-hun-
dred owners mark is arbitrary. It would also require some backup rules
to prevent circumvention, such as not permitting a holding company with
thousands of shareholders to be regarded as a single shareholder. It
would be less arbitrary than the current system, which limits S corpora-
tions, but not limited liability companies, to thirty-five owners.
B. OPERATIVE TAX RULES
Congress should also make the taxation of S corporations and partner-
ships as close as possible. One suggestion is to repeal Subchapter S, re-
tain Subchapters C and K, allow eligible entities to select conduit tax
treatment under Subchapter K, and subject all ineligible or nonelecting
businesses to section 11 and Subchapter C.' 28 Alternatively, but in a sim-
ilar vein, Congress could repeal Subchapter K, retain Subchapters C and
S, treat all entities like corporations, and allow conduit tax treatment for
eligible entities that select Subchapter S status. My preference is the lat-
ter choice because the Subchapter K rules are recondite and the Sub-
chapter S rules are easier to understand.
125. Congress evinced this resolve when it enacted section 7704 to quash conduit treat-
ment for publicly traded partnerships. See supra text accompanying notes 83 to 88.





Another possibility would be to eliminate the key differences between
partnership and Subchapter S taxation seriatim, i.e., on a section-by-sec-
'tion basis. This process would leave in place two parallel systems that
accomplish mostly the same tax consequences, a situation that I think
should be avoided, because it complicates the choice of entity issue. But
partnerships and corporations have different structures, and perhaps
Congress will decide that it cannot fit both structures under one set of
sections. One important change would involve the section 704 alloca-
tions. Congress should either make them available to eligible corpora-
tions or take them away from partnerships. I am not much concerned
with the direction in which that change goes. Another important change
would involve the ability of investors to add entity-level debt to their
outside basis. Congress could either take away the partners' capacity to
increase their basis in partnership interests by their share of partnership-
level debt, or it could let S corporation shareholders increase their basis
in their stock by their respective proportions of corporate-level debt. The
point of this paper is that the rule should be the same, no matter which
way it goes. Naturally, it would also make sense to eliminate the smaller
differences. For example, section 351 could be amended for S corpora-
tions so that the shareholders transferring property to the corporations
for stock would no longer be required to control the corporation immedi-
ately after the transfer. 129 Section 351 would then be aligned with section
721(a), Subchapter K's parallel rule to section 351, which does not condi-
tion a partner's nonrecognition upon his control of the partnership. 130
Congress could also exempt S corporations from the sections that cause
corporate-level recognition of gain on distributions of appreciated prop-
erty to shareholders.' 3' All the differences between S corporation taxa-
tion and partnership taxation should be eradicated.
VIII. CONCLUSION
No matter what the detailed distinctions between Subchapter S and K
may be, they make no sense. The conduit systems for partnerships and S
corporations are similar. It was the original intention of Congress to treat
S corporations like partnerships. Never has there been an intention to
make the tax consequences of one form better than the other. The dis-
tinctions have no principled basis. They are the result of the ad hoc de-
velopment of the tax law. They encourage the private sector to concoct
enterprise forms solely to attain the slightly better tax consequences of
partnership tax law. This happened with master limited partnerships and
is now happening with limited liability companies. The limited liability
company is not the product of serious reform. Its terms have to be
129. See I.R.C. §§ 351(a), 368(c) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
130. I.R.C. § 721(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
131. Section 311(b)(1) makes nonliquidating distributions of appreciated property to
shareholders a taxable sale for the distributing corporation. I.R.C. § 311(b)(1) (1988 &
Supp. 1994). Section 336(a) does the same for liquidating distributions. I.R.C. § 336(a)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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molded to fit within the confines of the Kintner Regulations. The "saf-
est" limited liability company statutes have mandatory rules to prevent
companies organized under them from having too many corporate char-
acteristics before attaining partnership tax status. The more flexible the
statute, the greater the danger that a company will accidentally cross the
C corporation line and lose its status as a conduit. In contrast, state cor-
poration codes are enabling acts permitting the owners of closely-held
corporations to set the governance structure that best suits their needs.
Congress should revisit the tax rules for conduits, evaluate their relative
merits, and enact a coherent system of reasoned tax regulation.

